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Social dilemmas are central to human society. Depletion of natural resources,
climate protection, security of energy supply, and workplace collaborations are all
examples of social dilemmas. Since cooperative behaviour in a social dilemma is
individually costly, Nash equilibrium predicts that humans should not cooperate.
Yet experimental studies show that people do cooperate even in anonymous one-
shot interactions. In spite of the large number of participants in many modern
social dilemmas, little is known about the effect of group size on cooperation. Does
larger group size favour or prevent cooperation? We address this problem both
experimentally and theoretically. Experimentally, we find that there is no general
answer: it depends on the strategic situation. Specifically, we find that larger
groups are more cooperative in the Public Goods game, but less cooperative in the
N-person Prisoner’s dilemma. Theoretically, we show that this behaviour is not
consistent with either the Fehr & Schmidt model or (a one-parameter version of)
the Charness & Rabin model, but it is consistent with the cooperative equilibrium
model introduced by the second author.
Social dilemmas are situations in which selfish interest collides with collective interest.
Every individual has an incentive to deviate from the common good, but if all subjects
acted selfishly they would all be worse off. Depletion of natural resources, intergroup
conflicts, climate protection, security of basic social systems, workplace collaborations,
and price competition in markets are just some of the fundamental situations that can
be modelled by means of a social dilemma. Consequently, understanding how and
why cooperation can evolve is of primary importance across all biological and social
sciences1–19.
In modern society, many social dilemmas involve a large number of players: firms
trying to sell (approximately) the same product, countries involved in reducing the
greenhouse gas emissions, taxpayers, work groups, etc. Yet, little is known about the
effect of group size on cooperation. Does group size influence cooperation and, if so,
how?
A classical point of view states that cooperation should be more difficult in larger
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groups: since the increase in the number of people inevitably leads to decreasing indi-
vidual gains relative to the cost of cooperation, free-riding would be much more per-
vasive in larger groups: large groups will fail; small groups may succeed2, 5. However,
others pointed out that the increase in the number of people does not necessarily lead to
lower individual gains: the incentive to cooperate can even increase and lead to a posi-
tive relation between the size of the group and the level of collective actions20, 21.
These two possibilities can be captured using two well-known economic games.
Public Goods Game (PGG). N ≥ 2 contributors are endowed with y dollars and
must simultaneously decide how much, if any, to contribute to a public pool. The total
amount in the pot is then multiplied by a constant and evenly redistributed among all
players. So the monetary payoff of player i is ui(x1, . . . , xN) = y−xi+γ(x1+. . .+xN),
where xi denotes i’s contribution, and the ‘marginal return’ γ is assumed to belong to
the open interval
(
1
N
, 1
)
.
N -person Prisoner’s Dilemma (NPD). N ≥ 2 agents have the choice of either co-
operate (C) or defect (D). To defect means doing nothing, while to cooperate means
paying a cost c > 0 to generate a benefit b > c that gets shared by all other players. So,
if C−i denotes the number of agents other than i who cooperate, then agent i’s payoff
is bC−i
N−1 − c , if i cooperates, and bC−iN−1 , if i defects.
The individual benefit for full cooperation in the PGG is equal to γN and so it increases
linearly with the number of players, while the individual cost for cooperation remains
constantly equal to y. On the other hand, both the individual benefit for full coopera-
tion, b, and the individual cost for cooperation, c, remain constant in the NPD as the
number of players increases, but, in order to reach the benefit, one needs more people
to cooperate. With the above discussion in mind, we should then observe a positive
effect of group size on cooperation in the PGG and a negative effect of group size on
cooperation in the NPD.
Experimental research has not helped much so far, though it has partially confirmed this
prediction. Some experimental results suggest that contributions to the public good are
slowly increasing with the number of players22, 23, while others suggest no group size
effect24 or even a negative effect25. Overall, the picture that emerges is that group size
has a moderate, positive effect on cooperation in PGG: in her meta-analysis, Zelmer26
uses data from 27 PGG experiments, conducted using different parametrisations and
procedures, and finds a positive, moderate (at the 10% level) effect of group size on
contributions. However, these experimental studies have been conducted on iterated
games, where long-term strategies and group structure may have played a role in shap-
ing the results.
The effect of group size on cooperation in the NPD is also unclear, but slightly in the
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opposite direction than the PGG: some studies report no effect27, and others report a
negative effect28, 32. The only studies regarding one-shot games27, 28 have the issue that,
together with the group size, they also vary either b or c. Since these latter parameters
are known to influence the rate of cooperation in opposite ways29–31, it is then difficult
to say which parameter has caused which effect. To the best of our knowledge, only one
study32 keeps b and c constant while varying the size of the group, but it was conducted
on iterated games rather than on one-shot games. In this study the authors vary the size
of the group from two to five players and find that two people are more cooperative
than three, but three people are statistically as cooperative as four or five people.
The experimental contribution of this paper is to clarify this point: Does group size have
an effect on cooperation in the PGG and NPD and, if so, how? Since repetitions may
create all sorts of ill-understood noise and spillovers across periods that make it difficult
to isolate the effect of the size of a group, we have focused on one-shot games. We have
conducted two experiments using the online labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT)33–35, one with the PGG and the other one with the NPD. In each of these studies
we have separated the participants in two conditions. In Condition S participants played
in small groups and in Condition L they played the same one-shot social dilemma but
in large groups. Our results are in line with the ones discussed above. We report a
significant negative effect of group size on cooperation in the NPD and a significant
positive effect of group size on cooperation in the PGG.
Our paper also provides a theoretical contribution. Since cooperation is typically en-
forced by means of external controls, such as punishment for defectors or reputation for
cooperators36–43, predicting the expected rate of cooperation without forms of external
controls would allow to optimise the use of these techniques, besides shedding light on
the cognitive basis of human decision-making. Are there theoretical models predicting
our findings? We show that our results are inconsistent with both Fehr & Schmidt’s44
and (the one parameter version of) Charness & Rabin’s45 models, but they are consis-
tent with the cooperative equilibrium model13, which indeed predicts both regularities
observed. Moreover, since the cooperative equilibrium is a parameter-free model, we
can make a direct comparison between experimental data and predictions. We show
that, though the predictions of the cooperative equilibrium model point qualitatively
in the same direction as the experimental data, they are quantitatively still quite off.
Further research is needed to understand how the model could be improved to fit the
experimental data better even from a quantitative point of view.
Experimental results
We recruited US subjects using the online labour market AMT. As in classical lab ex-
periments, AMT workers receive a baseline payment and can earn an additional bonus
depending on how they perform in the game. AMT experiments are easy to implement
and cheap to realise, since AMT workers are paid a substantially smaller amount of
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money than people participating in physical lab experiments. Nevertheless, it has been
shown that data gathered using AMT agree both qualitatively and quantitatively with
those collected in physical labs34, 35, 46, 47.
We conducted two studies: in Study A we investigated the group size effect on the
Public Goods game and in Study B we investigated the group size effect on the Pris-
oner’s dilemma. For the PGG we opted for small groups of size four and large groups
of size forty; for the NPD we opted for small groups of size two and large groups of
size eleven. These particular choices are due to the theoretical predictions presented
in the next section. Indeed, the cooperative equilibrium model predicts that the size of
the group has a weak positive effect on cooperation in the PGG and so here we opted
for a small group (four people) and a very large one (forty people); on the other hand,
the cooperative equilibrium predicts a strong (exponential) negative effect of the size
of he group on cooperation in the NPD. Thus we opted for a very small group N = 2,
because it might be possible that for N > 2 the rate of cooperation decays already
so much as to make every statistical analysis insignificant. The choice N = 11 for
large groups, was made only because we needed a number such that the benefit for
cooperation, that is $0.30, could be easily divided by N − 1.
Study A. Group size effect on cooperation in the Public Goods Game
As in other experimental23–25 and theoretical48, 49 works, we study group size effect on
cooperation in the Public Goods game by keeping the marginal return for cooperation
γ fixed and increasing the size of the group. Participants earned $0.30 for participa-
tion and were randomly assigned to either of two conditions. In Condition S (as in
small), they were asked to play a four-player PGG with endowment y = $0.10 and
constant marginal return γ = 0.5; in Condition L (as in large), they were asked to
play a forty-player PGG with the same endowment and marginal return. After the in-
structions, participants were asked to answer four comprehension questions. Subjects
failing any of them were automatically excluded from the game. Exact full instructions
are reported in the Method section.
62 subjects (31% female, average age 29.1) passed the comprehension questions in
Condition S and 66 subjects (51% female, mean age 28.9) passed the comprehension
questions in Condition L. In AMT experiments with comprehension questions it is
virtually impossible to stop the experiment when a precise number of participants is
reached. In order to compute the payoffs (for instance) in Condition L, we randomly
created two groups of forty people each and we computed the payoffs. Clearly some of
the participants belonged to both groups. For these participants we randomly selected
either of the two payoffs to be their final bonus.
Table 2 reports all relevant statistics. SEM denotes the standard error of the mean. It is
clear that increasing the group size has the effect that more and more people contribute
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to the public good. The visual impression is confirmed by the Wilcoxon rank-sum test
(P = 0.0002).
Study B. Group size effect on cooperation in the N -person Prisoner’s Dilemma
As in our first study, also Study B uses US subjects recruited through the online labour
market AMT. Participants earned $0.30 for participation and were randomly assigned
to either of two conditions. In Condition S, they were asked to play a two-player PD
with benefit b = $0.30 and cost c = $0.10. in Condition L, they were asked to play
an eleven-player PD with the same benefit and cost. Also here we asked for compre-
hension questions and we automatically excluded from the game those subjects who
fail to correctly answer any of them. Full instructions are reported in the Method sec-
tion.
75 subjects (28% female, average age 28.8) passed the comprehension questions in
Condition S and 78 subjects (32% female, mean age 29.6) passed the comprehension
questions in Condition L. Table 3 reports all relevant statistics. SEM denotes the stan-
dard error of the mean. It is clear that increasing the group size has the effect that fewer
and fewer people cooperate. The visual impression is confirmed by Wilcoxon rank-sum
test (P = 0.0404).
Theoretical results
The previous section reported experimental results in support of the following two find-
ings: (i) Group size has a positive effect on cooperation in the Public Goods Game; (ii)
Group size has a negative effect on cooperation in the N -person Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Are there mathematical models of human behaviour predicting both these regulari-
ties?
Here we first consider two of the most widely used models of human behaviour, the
Fehr & Schmidt44 and (a one-parameter version of) the Charness & Rabin’s45 models,
and we show that none of them predict the above regularities. Then we extend the coop-
erative equilibrium model13 from two-person social dilemmas to some social dilemmas
and we show that it in fact predicts both of them. Proofs of the results are postponed to
the Supplementary Information.
From now on, we fix the following notation. Given a game G, let P denote the set of
players, each of which has pure strategy set Si and monetary payoff function ui.
Fehr & Shmidt model
Fehr & Schmidt model44 assumes that, given the strategy profile σ, the utility of player i
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is
Ui(σ) = ui(σ)− αi
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
max(uj(σ)− ui(σ), 0)− βi
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
max(ui(σ)− uj(σ), 0),
(1)
where 0 ≤ βi ≤ αi are individual parameters. Specifically, αi represents the extent to
which player i is averse to inequity in the favour of others, and βi represents the extent
to which player i is averse to inequity in his favour.
Given a population P of players, each of which with parameters (αi, βi), we denote by
µ(P ,NPD(b, c)) the percentage of people i ∈ P such thatUi(C, . . . , C,D,C, . . . , C) ≤
Ui(C, . . . , C) in the NPD.
Proposition 1. For fixed b and c, the function µ(P ,NPD(b, c)) is decreasing with N .
Similarly, consider the PGG with total endowment normalised to be y = 1, so as
full cooperation means to contribute 1 and defection corresponds to contribute 0. Let
µ(P ,PGG(γ,N)) denote the percentage of people i ∈ P such thatUi(1, . . . , 1, 0, 1, . . . , 1) ≤
Ui(1, . . . , 1).
Proposition 2. For fixed γ, the function µ(P ,PGG(γ,N)) is independent of N .
In conclusion, while the results of our Study B are consistent with the Fehr-Schmidt
model, those of our Study A are not.
Charness & Rabin’s model
We consider the following simple form of the Charness & Rabin model45. Given a
strategy profile σ, we assume that player i experiences a tension between self interest
and common interest and so he or she has utility
Ui(σ) = αiui(σ) + (1− αi)
N∑
j=1
uj(σ), (2)
where αi ∈ [0, 1] is an individual parameter describing how much player i cares about
the total welfare.
As before, we consider a population P and we denote µ(P ,NPD(b, c)) the percent-
age of people i ∈ P such that Ui(C, . . . , C,D,C, . . . , C) ≤ Ui(D, . . . , D) in the
NPD.
Proposition 3. For fixed b and c the function µ(P ,NPD(b, c)) is independent of N .
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Proposition 4. For fixed γ, the function µ(PGG(γ,N)) is increasing with N .
In sum, this one-parametric version of the Charness & Rabin model makes qualitatively
the right prediction in the PGG, but not in the NPD.
We mention that the most general form of the Charness & Rabin model takes also into
account inequity aversion and uses the utility function
Vi(x1, . . . , xN) = (1− αi)xi + αi(δimin(x1, . . . , xn) + (1− δi)(x1 + . . .+ xN)).
(3)
Not surprisingly, this general version makes the right prediction in both the PGG and
the NPD (we leave the tedious computation to the reader). What we find surprising,
however, is that the ultimate reason for the different predictions is caused by two differ-
ent effects: the tendency to maximise group welfare favours cooperation in large PGG
and inequity aversion prevent cooperation in the NPD.
We now pass to the description of a model which predicts both regularities by appealing
to the same effect (tendency to maximise the group welfare) and without using any free
parameter. The price to pay is a major technical difficulty and the fact that the model,
at the moment, is definable only for what we call highly symmetric games.
Cooperative equilibrium
The cooperative equilibrium is a new parameter-free solution concept for two player
social dilemmas, which has been shown to make accurate predictions of average be-
haviour in one-shot13, 50 and iterated51 social dilemmas. It is typically a mixed strategy
depending on the payoffs, which organises all classical regularities: The level of coop-
eration in the Prisoner’s Dilemma increases as the cost/benefit ratio decreases; The level
of cooperation in the Traveler’s dilemma increases as the bonus/penalty decreases; The
level of cooperation in the Public Goods Game increases as the constant marginal re-
turn increases. We now extend this model to some N-player social dilemmas and show
that it predicts also the regularities reported in the Experimental Results section.
The key idea behind the cooperative equilibrium is the assumption that humans do not
act a priori as single agents, but they forecast how the game would be played if they
formed coalitions and then act so as to maximise their forecast.
A general theory for every normal form game would require to consider all possible
coalition structures and deal with the fact that different players may have different fore-
casts about the same coalition structure. Here we eliminate this problem by restricting
to only highly symmetric social dilemmas.
• Symmetry. All players have the same set of strategies S and for each player i, for
each permutation pi of the set of players, and for each strategy profile (s1, . . . , sN) ∈
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SN one has
ui(s1, . . . , sN) = upi(i)(spi(1), . . . , spi(N)). (4)
• High symmetry. The game is symmetric and has a unique (and symmetric) Nash
equilibrium and a unique (and symmetric) profile of strategy maximizing the total
welfare.
Given the high level of symmetry of the games under consideration, we consider only
the two extremal scenarios: the selfish coalition structure and the fully cooperative
coalition structure.
Let P denote the set of players, each of which has pure strategy set S, mixed strategy
set P(S), and utility function ui. Coalition structures are just partitions of the player
set. We denote ps the selfish coalition structure and pc the fully cooperative coalition
structure. Every coalition structure p ∈ {ps, pc} gives rise to a new game Gp, where
players in the same coalition play as a single player aiming to maximise the sum of the
payoffs of the players belonging to that coalition. For every highly symmetric social
dilemma, Gp has a unique Nash equilibrium, which we denote σp. Fix i ∈ P and let
j ∈ P \ {i} be another player. We denote Ij(p) the maximum payoff that player j can
obtain by leaving the coalition structure p. Formally,
Ij(p) := max{uj(σp−j, σj)− uj(σp−j, σpj ) : σj ∈ P(S)}. (5)
Ij(p) will be called the incentive of player j to abandon the coalition structure p.
Given a profile of strategies (σ1, . . . , σN), a strategy σ′i ∈ P(S) is called an i-deviation
from (σ1, . . . , σN) if ui(σ′i, σ−i) ≥ ui(σ1, . . . , σN).
We denote Dj(p) the maximal loss that players j can incur if he decides to leave the
coalition structure p to try to achieve his maximal possible gain, but also other players
deviate from the coalition structure p to either follow their selfish interests or anticipate
player j’s deviation. Formally,
Dj(p) := max{uj(σpi , σp−i)− uj(σj, σ−j)}, (6)
where σj runs over the set of strategies such that uj(σ
p
−j, σj) is maximized and σ−j
runs over the set of profiles of strategies (σk)k 6=j for which there is h such that σh is an
h-deviation from either σp or (σpj , σ−j). Dj(p) is called the disincentive for player j in
abandoning the coalition structure p. The number
τi,j(p) :=
Ij(p)
Ij(p) +Dj(p)
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will be informally interpreted as the probability that player i assigns to the event “player j,
knowing that all other players are thinking about playing according to p, abandons the
coalition structure p”. In the context of anonymous games, where the reasoning of a
player cannot affect the reasoning of another player, we define, for J 6= ∅,
τi,J(p) :=
∏
j∈J
τi,j(p).
Now to define τi,∅(p), which is the probability that nobody abandons the coalition struc-
ture, we use the law of total probabilities. Assume, for simplicity, that τi,j(p) does not
depend on i and j, as is the case in symmetric games. We find
τi,∅(p) = 1−
N−1∑
k=1
(−1)k+1
(
N − 1
k
)
τi,j(p)
k
= 1 +
N−1∑
k=1
(−1)k
(
N − 1
k
)
τi,j(p)
k
=
N−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
N − 1
k
)
τi,j(p)
k
=
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(−τi,j(p))k.
Using Newton’s binomial law we finally find
τi,∅(p) = (1− τi,j(p))N−1.
Now, let ei,∅(p) be the minimum payoff for player i if nobody abandons the coalition
structure p, which is just ui(σp), and, finally, let ei,J(p) be the infimum of payoffs of
player i when she plays σpi but at least one player j ∈ J \ {i} plays a j-deviation from
σp. The forecast of player i associated to the coalition structure p is defined as
vi(p) :=
∑
J⊆P\{i}
ei,J(p)τi,J(p). (7)
Observe that symmetry implies that the forecast vi(p), if p ∈ {ps, pc}, actually does not
depend on i and so there is a coalition structure p (independent of i) which maximises
the forecast for all players. Moreover, vi(p) = vj(p), for all i, j ∈ P . We denote this
number v(p) and we use it to define common beliefs or, in other words, to make a tacit
binding among the players.
Definition 1. The induced game Ind(G, p) is the same game as G except for the set of
profiles of strategies: the induced game contains only those strategy profiles σ such that
ui(σ) ≥ v(p), for all i ∈ P .
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The induced game does not depend on the maximizing coalition structure, that is, in
case of multiple coalition structures maximising the forecast, one can choose one of
them casually to define the induced game and this game does not depend on such a
choice.
Since the set of strategy profiles in the induced game is convex and compact (and non-
empty) one can compute Nash equilibria of the induced game.
Definition 2. A cooperative equilibrium for G is a Nash equilibrium of the game
Ind(G, p).
It has been proven in 13 that this model organises all classical observations on two-
person social dilemmas: The rate of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma increases
as the cost/benefit ratio decreases; the rate of cooperation in the Traveler’s dilemma
increases as the bonus/penalty decreases; the rate of cooperation in the Public Goods
Game increases as the constant marginal return increases. We now show that it organ-
ises also the regularities observed in our experiments.
Let PGG(N, γ) denote the Public Goods Game with N players and constant marginal
return γ. To simplify the formulas, we assume that the total endowment of each player
is normalized to y = 1. Denote
v(γ,N) = γN
(
γN − 1
γ(N − 1)
)N−1
+ γ
(
1−
(
γN − 1
γ(N − 1)
)N−1)
. (8)
Theorem 1. The only (pure) cooperative equilibrium of the PGG(N, γ) is to contribute
max
(
0,
v(γ,N)− 1
γN − 1
)
. (9)
In particular, it is increasing with the variable N .
Let PD(b, c,N) denote the N -person Prisoner’s Dilemma with cost c and benefit b.
Denote
v(b, c,N) = (b− c)
(
1− c
b
)N−1
− c
(
1−
(
1− c
b
)N−1)
.
Theorem 2. The only cooperative equilibrium ofPD(b, c,N) predicts cooperation with
probability
λ = max
(
0,
v(b, c,N)
b− c
)
.
So cooperation is predicted to decrease with the number of agents.
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Comparison between predictions and experimental data
Table 4 summarizes the comparison between the models in consideration. Fehr &
Schmidt’s model makes qualitatively the right prediction in the NPD but not in the
PGG; the one-parameter version of the Charness & Rabin model makes qualitatively
the right prediction in the PGG but not in the NPD. The two-parameter version of the
Charness & Rabin model makes qualitatively the right prediction for both games, at
the price of using two free parameters. The cooperative equilibrium makes qualita-
tively the right prediction for both games, without using any free parameter. Since the
cooperative equilibrium is parameter-free, we can make a direct comparison between
its predictions and experimental data. Results are summarised in Table 5 and Table
6. While the qualitative behaviour is well-captured, the quantitative prediction is still
quite off. An interesting topic for further research is to understand what can be done to
improve the quantitative predictions.
Discussion
We have studied how the size of a group influences cooperation in two one-shot social
dilemmas, the Public Goods Game and the N -person Prisoner’s Dilemma. The reason
why we have considered these two games is that we expected opposite results. In
the PGG the invidual benefit for full cooperation is equal to γN and so it increases
linearly with the size of the group, while the cost of cooperation remains constantly
equal to y; in the NPD both the individual benefit for full cooperation b and the cost of
cooperation c remain constant, but, in order to reach the benefit, one needs more people
to cooperate. This difference suggests that we should see a positive effect of group size
on cooperation in the PGG and a negative effect of group size on cooperation in the
NPD.
To test this prediction we have conducted two experiments using the online labour
market Amazon Mechanical Turk. Our results confirmed it showing that forty players
are significantly more efficient in providing the public good than only four players
(P=0.0002), and that two players are significantly more cooperative than eleven in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma (P=0.0404).
Although the positive effect of group size on cooperation in the PGG has long been
debated26, 54, we do not find it to be very surprising. It is indeed predicted by the Char-
ness & Rabin model. Also theoretical research on iterated spatial PGGs shows that
group size should have a positive effect on cooperation, at least when the PGG is played
on a lattice and, after each round, a vertex can take one of his neighbours’ strategy with
probability depending on the payoff difference49.
Yet, surprisingly, we have found that neither the Fehr & Schmidt model nor (a one-
parameter version of) the Charness & Rabin model predict both the regularities ob-
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served. The general form of Charness & Rabin’s utility makes the right prediction,
at the price of using two free parameters. Moreover, different predictions are due to
different causes: tendency to maximise the group welfare favours cooperation in large
PGGs and inequity aversion prevents cooperation in large NPDs.
We have then extended the cooperative equilibrium model from two-player social dilem-
mas to some N-player symmetric games, that we have called highly symmetric. Despite
the fact that this model does not use any free parameter, it is able to predict both the
above mentioned regularities by appealing to a single cause: tendency to maximise to-
tal welfare. The quantitative predictions of the model are not dramatically far from the
data we gathered, but, at least in three out of four cases, they are still quite off. More
experimental data are needed to understand if and how the model can be improved to
fit the data better also from a quantitative point of view. In a one-shot setting, as the
one under consideration, it is likely that a substantial proportion of players make com-
putational mistakes when they reason about the strategy they want to choose. Thus, a
promising direction of research is to define a sort of quantal cooperative equilibrium
in a similar way as the standard notion of quantal response equilibrium52 is defined.
Ideally, the quantal cooperative equilibrium would be a one-parameter solution concept
where the parameter represents the extent to which the players make mistakes in the
computations needed to compute the cooperative equilibrium.
Other research questions are worth being mentioned. One way to look at our exper-
imental results is as follows. By leaving both the cost and the benefit of cooperation
constant, the group size has a negative effect on cooperation, while, when the increase
in the number of agents correspond to an increase in the benefit of cooperation (or,
equivalently, to a decrease in the cost of cooperation), then the size of the group may
have a positive effect on cooperation which is ultimately due to the increase of the bene-
fit of cooperation (or to the decrease of the cost of cooperation). Our results thus suggest
that the pure effect of the group size on cooperation is negative: more people are less
likely to cooperate. The group size might have a positive effect only when it generates
an increase of the benefit of cooperation or a decrease of the cost of cooperation. Since
the difference between the benefit for cooperation and the cost of cooperation in the
Public Goods game can be seen as an externally imposed reward to enforce coopera-
tion, it is interesting to figure out what is the cheapest sequence (parametrized by the
size of the group) of rewards that gives rise to a positive effect of the size of the group
on cooperation. More precisely, let 1 < bN < N be a non-decreasing sequence of
real number. Define the N -player general Public Goods game to be the N -player game
where each player can either contribute 0 or 1 and gets monetary payoff
ui(x1, . . . , xN) = 1− xi + bN
N
N∑
j=1
xj,
where xj denotes player j’s contribution. Our results show that the group size has a
positive effect on cooperation when bN increases linearly with the number of players
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(bN = γN in the standard PGG) and it has a negative effect on cooperation when bN is
constant in N (which is essentially equivalent to the NPD). Consequently, there must
be a sequence bN of numbers representing the behavioural transition from a negative
effect of the group size on cooperation to a positive effect. An interesting question
would be to find this sequence.
Our model also predicts existence of strategic situations for which group size has a
non-linear effect with intermediate groups being more cooperative. Theorems 1 and 2
indeed imply that a general PGG defined by a sequence bN = γN , for N ≤ N0, and
bN = bN0 , for all N > N0, will have a cooperative equilibrium whose maximum level
of cooperation is reached for some intermediate group size. This strategic situation
is likely to happen in real-life situations, in which when the number of cooperators
reaches a saturation threshold, no additional benefit is created. A concrete example
of such a situation has been recently reported in ref. 53. Here the authors report a
field study in which intermediate groups were more cooperative than small and large
groups. The case reported is that of monitoring the Wolong Nature Reserve, Sichuan
Province, China, by means of a number of households. They found that if the number of
households is either too small or too large, then the monitoring effort of each household
is also small; the monitoring effort of the households is maximized when the number
of households is somewhat intermediate.
Other research questions come from looking at some of the predictions made by the
cooperative equilibrium model.
• For fixed N and c, the benefit b has a positive effect on cooperation in the NPD.
• For fixed N and b, the cost c has a negative effect on cooperation in the NPD.
Confirmation of these two predictions have been recently found in the case of two
players29–31 and we cannot find any reasonable motivation why they should fail in larger
groups.
The model also predicts that, with N fixed, γ has a positive effect on cooperation in the
PGG. This fact has been confirmed by several experimental studies on both one-shot
and iterated PGGs26, 54–57.
Another highly symmetric social dilemma to which the cooperative equilibrium model
can be applied is the Bertrand Competition (BC). In the BC, N ≥ 2 firms compete to
sell their identical product. Each of the firms can choose a price between the ‘price
floor’ L and the ‘reservation value’ H > L. The firm that chooses the lowest price, say
s, sells the product at that price, getting a payoff of s; all other firms get nothing. Ties
get split among all firms that made the corresponding price. One easily sees that the
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only cooperative equilibrium of this game is to set the price
max
(
L,H ·
(
H
(H − 1)N
)N−1)
. (10)
So the cooperative equilibrium makes the prediction that the size of the group has a
strong (more than exponential) negative effect on cooperation in the BC. This predic-
tion has been partially confirmed by other experimental studies58–60, which have shown
that four people are already enough to completely destroy cooperative behaviour. How-
ever, these studies concern iterated games and so more experimental evidence would
be needed.
On the theoretical side, many questions concerning the model should be addressed,
starting from the broad question of extending the cooperative equilibrium model as far
as possible, at least to include other relevant social dilemmas such as the Volunteer
dilemma61 and the collective-risk social dilemma62. Unfortunately, these social dilem-
mas possess one of the general characteristics preventing the development of a general
theory: in case the game Gp has many (possibly infinite) equilibria, which one should be
used as a reference strategy profiles σp to compute incentives and disincentives? Other
theoretical questions include: Can the cooperative equilibrium be expressed in terms of
classical utility theory through a utility function to be maximised?
Method
The experimental part of this article uses US subjects recruited through Amazon Me-
chanical Turk. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experiments using
economic games (PGGlarge, PGGsmall, NPDlarge, NPDsmall). After entering the sur-
vey, AMT workers were asked to type their Turk ID and a long CAPTCHA-like code.
Specifically, in order to filter out lazy participants, we asked them to write the following
neutral sentence (taken from Wikipedia) in reverse order.
Morocco has a coast on the Atlantic Ocean that reaches past the Strait of Gibraltar
into the Mediterranean Sea. It is bordered by Spain to the north, Algeria to the east,
and Western Sahara to the south. Since Morocco controls most of Western Sahara, its
de facto southern boundary is with Mauritania.
Participants who passed this first test were presented the rules of the game. In Condition
PGGsmall they were presented as follows:
You are part of a group of four participants. The amount of money you can earn depends
on each of the four participants’ decisions.
All participants are given 10 /c and each one has to decide how much, if any, to con-
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tribute to a pool. Your gain will be what you keep plus half of the total amount con-
tributed by all players.
So, for instance:
• If everyone contributes all of their money, then you end the game with 20 /c.
• If you do not contribute anything and everyone else contributes all of their money,
then you end the game with 25 /c.
• If no one contributes anything, then you end the game with 10 /c.
Instructions for Condition PGGlarge were exactly the same, a part from obvious changes.
Instructions for Condition NPDsmall were instead presented as follows:
You have been paired with another participant. The amount of money you can earn
depends on your and the other participant’s decision.
You are both given 10 /c and each of you must decide whether to keep it or give it away.
Each time a participant gives away their 10 /c, the other participant earns 30 /c.
So:
• If you both decide to give the 10 /c, you end the game with 30 /c.
• If you keep it and the other participant gives it away, you end the game with 40 /c.
• If you give it away and the other participant keeps it, you end the game with 0 /c.
• If you both keep it, then you end the game with 10 /c.
Instructions for Condition NPDlarge were exactly the same, a part from obvious changes.
In order to have good quality results, after explaining the rules of the game, we asked
four comprehension questions. Participants who failed any of the comprehension ques-
tions were automatically excluded from the game. We could do this very easily using
the Survey builder Qualtrics, which allows us to use skip logics: programs that automat-
ically end the survey if the correct answer is not selected. Questions were formulated
in such a way to make clear the duality between maximising one’s own payoff and
maximising the others’ payoff. Specifically, we asked the following questions.
1. What is the choice you should make to maximise your gain?
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2. What is the choice you should make to maximise the other participants’ gains?
3. What choice should the other participants make to maximise their own gains?
4. What choice should the other participants make to maximise your gain?
Subjects who passed the comprehension questions were then asked to make their de-
cision. After playing, subjects were asked a few basic demographic questions (gender,
age, and level of education) and the reason why they made their decision. After this,
the survey ended providing the code to claim for the bonus. Participants were also in-
formed that computation and payment of the bonuses would be made at the end of the
experiment. No deception was used. Written consent was obtained by all participants,
and the experiments were approved by the Southampton University Ethics Commit-
tee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research and carried out in accordance with the
approved guidelines.
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Condition % free-riders % contributors Mean contribution SEM
S 48.38 30.64 3.92 0.56
L 21.21 60.60 6.91 0.51
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of Study 1. Public Goods Game with 4 players
(Condition S) versus PGG with 40 players (Condition L). In both conditions, the
maximum possible contribution was $0.10 and the marginal return was γ = 0.5.
The results show clearly that the larger group is much more cooperative than
the smaller group and this is confirmed by the statistical analysis, showing that
the means are signifcantly different (Rank-sum, p = 0.0002).
Condition % free-riders % contributors Mean contribution SEM
S 48.38 30.64 3.92 0.56
L 21.21 60.60 6.91 0.51
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of Study 1. Public Goods Game with 4 players
(Condition S) versus PGG with 40 players (Condition L). In both conditions, the
maximum possible contribution was $0.10 and the marginal return was γ = 0.5.
The results show clearly that the larger group is much more cooperative than
the smaller group and this is confirmed by the statistical analysis, showing that
the means are signifcantly different (Rank-sum, p = 0.0002).
Condition % cooperators SEM
S 41.33 4.87
L 25.64 4.97
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of Study 2. Prisoner’s Dilemma with 2 players
(Condition S) versus Prisoner’s Dilemma with 11 players (Condition L). In both
conditions, b = $0.30 and c = $0.10. The results suggest that larger groups are
less cooperative than smaller ones. This is confirmed by the statistical analysis,
which show that the means are significantly difference (Rank-sum, p = 0.0404).
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Model PGG NPD free parameters
FS none negative two
CR1 positive none one
CR2 positive negative two
CE positive negative none
Table 4: Summary of the predictions of the models under consideration. FS
denotes the Fehr & Schmidt model, which predicts no group size effect on
cooperation in the PGG, a negative effect of group size on cooperation in the
NPD, and uses two free parameters; CR1 denotes the Charness & Rabin model
with only one free parameter; CR2 denotes the Charness & Rabin model with
two parameters; finally, CE denotes the cooperative equilibrium model.
Condition Mean contribution CE prediction
S 3.92 0
L 6.91 3.46
Table 5: Comparison between predictions of the cooperative equilibrium and
experimental data in the PGG. In Condition S, the cooperative equilibrium co-
incides with the Nash equilibrium. In Condition L, it predicts that players should
contribute about 35% of their endowment. CE correctly predicts a positive effect
of group size on cooperation.
Condition % cooperators CE prediction
S 41.33 50
L 25.64 0
Table 6: Comparison between the prediction of the cooperative equilibrium and
experimental data. The cooperative equilibrium coincides with the Nash equi-
librium in Condition L and predicts that half of the people cooperate in Condi-
tion S. The cooperative equilibrium correctly predicts a negative effect of group
size on cooperation in the NPD.
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Supplementary Information
In this Supplementary Information we collect the proofs of all the results we stated in
the Theoretical Results section.
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix, for notational simplicity, i = 1. We have U1(C, . . . , C) =
b− c and
U1(D,C, . . . , C) = b− β1
(
b− bN − 2
N − 1 + c
)
= b− bβ1
(N − 1) −
cβ1
N − 1 .
It is clear that if N is large enough (depending on the player and on b and c), one has
U1(D,C, . . . , C) > U1(C, . . . , C).
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix player i = 1. We have U1(1, . . . , 1) = γN and
U1(0, 1, . . . , 1) = γ(N − 1) + 1− β1 (γ(N − 1) + 1− γ(N − 1))
= γ(N − 1) + 1− β1.
It is clear then clear that the condition U1(0, 1, . . . , 1) > U1(1, . . . , 1) is independent of
N .
Proof of Proposition 3. Fix i = 1. We have U1(C, . . . , C) = α1(b− c) + (1− α1)(b−
c)(N − 1) and
U1(D,C, . . . , C) = α1b+ (1− α1)b+ (1− α1)(N − 1)
(
b(N − 2)
N − 1 − c
)
= b+ (1− α1)(bN − 2b− cN + c).
Observe that the condition U1(D,C, . . . C) > U1(C, . . . , C) reduces to α > 1− cb and
so it does not depend on N .
Proof of Proposition 4. We have U1(1, . . . , 1) = α1γN + γN2 − α1γN2 and
U1(0, 1, . . . , 1) = α1(1 + γ(N − 1)) + (1− α1)(1 + γ(N − 1)) + γ(1− α1)(N − 1)2
= 1− γN + γN2 + 2α1γN − α1γN2 − α1γ.
It is then clear that the condition U1(0, 1, . . . , 1) < U1(1, . . . , 1) reduces to
1− α1γ + γN(α1 − 1) < 0,
which is always verified if N is large enough.
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Proof of Theorem 1. Since Gps = G, then σps is the Nash equilibrium of the original
game. Since there is no incentive to deviate from a Nash equilibrium, the τ measure is
the Dirac measure concentrated on J = ∅. Therefore vi(ps) coincides with the payoff
in equilibrium; that is, vi(ps) = 1.
Let now pc be the fully cooperative coalition structure and observe that, for all j ∈ P ,
one has Ij(pc) = 1− γ and Dj(pc) = γN − 1. Consequently, τi,j(pc) = 1−γγ(N−1) , for all
i, j ∈ P , i 6= j. Now, ei,J(pc) = γ, for all J 6= ∅, and ei,∅(pc) = γN . Therefore,
vi(pc) = γN
(
1− 1− γ
γ(N − 1)
)N−1
+ γ
(
1−
(
1− 1− γ
γ(N − 1)
)N−1)
= γN
(
γN − 1
γ(N − 1)
)N−1
+ γ
(
1−
(
γN − 1
γ(N − 1)
)N−1)
.
To compute the cooperative equilibrium, we observe that this would be the lowest con-
tribution among the ones which, if contributed by all players, would give to all players a
payoff of at least vi(pc). To compute this contribution it is enough to solve the equation
1− λ+ γNλ = vi(pc),
whose solution is indeed λ = vi(pc)−1
γN−1 , as stated.
It remains to show that the cooperative equilibrium is increasing with N . To this end,
we replaceN by a continuous variable x ≥ 2 and denote v(x) := vi(pc), f(x) = v(x)−1γx−1 ,
and r(x) =
(
γx−1
γ(x−1)
)x−1
. Observe that all these functions are differentiable in our
domain of interest x ≥ 2. Our aim is to show that f(x) is increasing, that is, f ′(x) > 0.
We start by observing that r(x) is increasing. This can be seen essentially in the same
way as one sees the standard fact that
(
1 + 1
n
)n is increasing in n, by using Bernoulli’s
inequality. Hence, we have
v′(x) = γr(x) + γr′(x)(x− 1) > γr(x).
Consequently, using also the fact that γxr(x) = v(x)− γ(1− r(x)), we conclude
f ′(x) =
v′(x)(γx− 1)− γ(v(x)− 1)
(γx− 1)2
>
γ(γxr(x)− v(x) + 1)
(γx− 1)2
=
γ(1− γ(1− r(x)))
(γx− 1)2
> 0,
where, the last inequality follows from the fact that both γ and r(x) are strictly smaller
than 1.
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Proof. The forecast associated to the selfish coalition structure is vi(ps) = 0, for all
players, corresponding to the payoff in (Nash) equilibrium. To compute the forecast
associated to the fully cooperative coalition structure, observe that ei,∅(pc) = b − c,
corresponding to Pareto optimum where all players cooperate. The incentive to deviate
from the cooperative strategy is Ij(pc) = c, while the disincentive is Dj(pc) = b − c,
corresponding to the loss incurred in case all other players anticipate player j’s defection
and decide to defect as well. Finally, ei,J(pc) = −c, for all J 6= ∅, corresponding to the
strategy profile where only player i cooperates and all other players defect. Hence we
have
vi(pc) = (b− c)
(
1− c
b
)N−1
− c
(
1−
(
1− c
b
)N−1)
.
Of course, if vi(pc) ≤ 0, then the cooperative equilibrium coincides with the Nash
equilibrium. Otherwise, by symmetry, it is the only strategy σ such that
ui(σ, . . . , σ) = vi(pc), (11)
for all i ∈ P . Setting σ = λC + (1− λ)D, we obtain
ui(σ, . . . , σ) = λ
N−1∑
k=0
λN−1−k(1− λ)k
(
N − 1
k
)(
b(N − 1− k)
N − 1 − c
)
+ (1− λ)
N−1∑
k=0
λN−1−k(1− λ)k
(
N − 1
k
)(
b(N − 1− k)
N − 1
)
=
N−1∑
k=0
λN−1−k(1− λ)k
(
N − 1
k
)
b(N − 1− k)
N − 1 − cλ
= b− cλ− b
N − 1
N−1∑
k=0
λN−1−k(1− λ)k
(
N − 1
k
)
k.
Now we use the fact that
N−1∑
k=0
λN−1−k(1− λ)k
(
N − 1
k
)
k = (1− λ)(N − 1),
to reduce Equation (11) to
λ(b− c) = vi(pc), (12)
which concludes the proof.
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